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NOTES
CIVIL RICO AND PARENS PATRIAE: LOWERING
LITIGATION BARRIERS THROUGH STATE
INTERVENTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 1
(RICO) is a criminal and civil statute designed to rid the economy
of organized crime or any corrupt practice.2 RICO prohibits the
use of racketeering-derived 3 funds to invest M,4 control,5 or oper-
ate6 an "enterprise."'7 The statute defines racketeering as a series
of already unlawful acts commonly committed by organized
criminals to which the crminal or civil sanctions of RICO apply.'
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). RICO is Title IX of the Organzed
Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). Through
OCCA's 11 titles, Congress intended to eradicate organized crime in America using a "com-
prehensive, integrated program." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter cited as S. REP. No. 617]. See generally McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or
its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970).
A study of RICO reveals Congress' deep concern over organized crime and its pervasive
effects on businesses and consumers. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969). For a detailed account of organized crime's infiltration into the American economy,
see THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocmTY, A REPORT BY THE PRESMENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, 437-86 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
PRESIDENT'S REPORT].
2. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 76; See also 116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). For the definition of racketeering, see infra note 8.
4. Id. § 1962(a).
5. Id. § 1962(b).
6. Id. § 1962(c).
7. "Enterprise" means individuals, legal entities, and illegal entities, including partner-
ships, corporations, unincorporated associations, and unions. Id. § 1961(4). See United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). An enterprise probably includes government enti-
ties. See generally Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1004, 1023-28 (1980).
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a corpo-
ration could be both a defendant and the enterprise. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961
(11th Cir. 1982).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) defines racketeering activity as any serious state felony, or viola-
tions of federal bribery, counterfeiting, interstate theft, embezzlement, extortion, gambling,
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RICO's criminal sanctions include fines, imprisonment, and
criminal forfeiture of all interests in the enterprise. 9 Although
these criminal sanctions are the focus of most RICO prosecu-
tions,10 Congress intended that RICO's civil sanctions be the stat-
ute's central thrust." These civil sanctions include structural rem-
edies such as divestiture, injunctions, dissolutions, and
reorganizations. 2 More importantly, RICO provides a private
treble damage remedy for those injured in their business or prop-
erty by racketeering activities.'" A private person can use this rem-
mail or wire fraud, securities fraud, obstruction of justice, or narcotics statutes. 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1) (1976). See also Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest:
"Everybody's Darling", 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 655, 656-57 (1982).
Because racketeering activities are specifically defined state and federal offenses, RICO
does not create new offenses. Rather, it creates new remedies to deal with existing offenses.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
10. Since 1970, only 50 civil RICO cases have been brought. None of these actions dealt
with organized crime figures. During the same period, hundreds of criminal RICO cases have
been litigated successfully. See infra notes 35 & 46.
11. RICO's central purpose is economic and remedial, not punitive. RICO's "Statement of
Findings and Purpose" states that:
(1) Organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified,
and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct.
Organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Na-
tion's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations,
interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign com-
merce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of
the Nation and its citizens.
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1073. RICO as a remedial statute also has the advan-
tages of a lower civil proof standard, broader discovery, and the immediate effect of injunc-
tions. See PiEsmENr's REPORT, supra note 1, at 483; S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 81;
116 CONG. REC. 35,313 (1970). A criminal conviction under RICO is not a prerequisite for
applying the civil remedies. Usaco Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1
(6th Cir. 1982); Parnes v. Hemold Commodities Inc., 487 F Supp. 645 (N.D. Il1. 1980); Hei-
nold Commodities Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Farmer's Bank of the
State of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976).
13. Id. § 1964(c). Controversy exists as to whether a private person may sue for structural
injunctive relief, such as dissolution, under § 1964. Some cases and commentators believe
that RICO does not allow private persons to sue in equity to prevent or restrain a § 1962
violation through the structural sanctions in § 1964(a). The statute only permits individuals
to sue for treble damages. See Kaushal v. State Bank of India, No. 82 C 7414 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
2, 1983)(available on LEXIS); McKeon, The Incursion by Organized Crime into Legitimate
Business, 20 J. PUBL. L. 117, 132 (1971). For a discussion of private divestiture suits in
antitrust, see Comment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child, 41 FORDHAM
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edy independently or in conjunction with any government civil
action.14
RICO arose from Congress' deep concern over organized crime's
infiltration into the economy.15 Many courts and commentators,
however, interpret the statute broadly, and use RICO to combat
any form of sustained corrupt practice that significantly damages a
business or threatens the economy.16 These practices include vari-
ous white collar crimes and government corruption, 7 securities
L. REv. 569 (1973). This interpretation seems correct if § 1964 is read literally. Section
1964(a) grants the federal district courts jurisdiction to try civil RICO cases. Section 1964(b)
gives the Attorney General standing to sue for structural relief, and § 1964(c) gives a private
individual standing to sue for treble damages. This interpretation also prevents businessmen
from using divestiture suits for harassment of competitors. See Note, Enforcing Criminal
Laws through Civil Proceedings: Section 1964 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970), 53 TEx. L. REv. 1055, 1059 n.34 (1975).
Other commentators believe that § 1964 gives a private citizen the right to sue for both
structural and remedial relief. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 7, at 1038 n.133. "A congres-
sional grant of the right to sue in absence of statutory limitations, conveys the availability of
all necessary and appropriate relief." Id. (emphasis added). This interpretation follows the
general rule that courts interpret remedial statutes broadly. See E. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 243, 251 (1940). Additionally, the treble damage clause is preceded by the
expansive word "and," not "to," suggesting a broader interpretation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1976). See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 7, at 1038 n.133. See also Strafer, Massumn &
Skolnick, supra note 8, at 709-15.
Congress believed that only full cooperation between private persons and the federal gov-
ernment could deter corrupt practices. 116 CoNG. Rac. 35,227 (1970). Moreover, Congress
modeled RICO after the Clayton Antitrust Act, which grants private structural relief. 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1976). By implication, therefore, RICO provides a similar right of action.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976) confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts to hear
civil RICO actions. A court can join a government and a private action under FEa. R. CiV. P
20 if the claims relate to the same occurrence and present common questions of law or fact.
15. See supra note 1.
16. Only three court decisions interpret RICO to apply solely to organized crime: Water-
man Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F Supp. 256 (E.D. La. 1981); Adair
v. Hunt Int'l Resources, 526 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. IM. 1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS Inc., 66 F.R.D.
109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Some commentators and other courts have criticized these decisions.
See infra note 64.
17. McClellan, supra note 1, at 55. White collar crime is very similar to organized crime
both in methods and economic effects. See White Collar Crime Symposium, 17 AM. CRim.
L. Rav. 271 (1980). Because RICO prohibits conduct, not status, United States v. Forsythe,
560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977); 166 CONG. Rac. 35,343 (1970), and its civil remedies
should be interpreted broadly, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976); E. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 251 (1940), RICO should apply to serious white collar offenses. Indeed, because of the
fear of reprisal when suing organized crine, most civil RICO cases have involved white col-
lar crimes. See Strafer, Massumi & Skolmck, supra note 8, at 662 nn.54-57.
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fraud,'8 mail and wire fraud, 19 and tax fraud.2"
This Note will critique RICO's central premise and discuss how
RICO fails to deal effectively with three major problems most pri-
vate plaintiffs face when initiating a civil RICO action: fear of re-
prisal, proof of causation, and establishing standing by proof of in-
jury. The Note then will suggest that Congress reform RICO by
providing for a state parens patriae action. 2' Because a state action
for treble damages brought on injured citizens' behalf aggregates
claims while affording protection, a parens patriae action would
lessen a plaintiff's fear of reprisals and eliminate his burdens of
proving causation and injury
CiviL RICO
Under section 1962, RICO forbids persons from controlling or
conspiring to control any enterprise through one of three possible
racketeering activities. 2 Section 1962(a) prohibits investment in
legitimate businesses of income derived from corrupt practices.23
18. See Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Sug-
gested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Causb of Action, 85 DICK. L. REv. 201
(1981). See also Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 546 F Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Farmer's Bank of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978);
Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HI-Rv. L.
Rav. 1101, 1115 (1982). For an argument for a narrower interpretation, see Comment, Civil
RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or Businessman, 36 Sw. L.J. 925, 943-46
(1982).
19. Note, supra note 18; Comment, supra note 18, at 938-43.
20. Zuckerman & Hunterton, RICO and Tax Fraud: Return(s) to Racketeering, 18 CaM.
L. BULL. 204 (1982).
21. A RICO parens patriae reform was outlined by I. Nathan in Proposed Amendments
for RICO: Making a Criminal Law More Civil, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1981, at 28.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976).
23. Id. § 1962(a).
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal
within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income,
in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any en-
terprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of
investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the
control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful
under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the
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Subsection (b) prohibits obtaining interests in businesses through
corrupt practices, 24 and subsection (c) prohibits conducting enter-
prise affairs through corrupt practices.2 5
RICO's civil sanctions, contained in section 1964, also are di-
vided into three parts. Subsection (a) grants the federal courts eq-
uitable jurisdiction to prevent or restrain RICO violations, as well
as express powers of divestiture, dissolution, and reorganization. 26
Subsection (b) provides for a government civil RICO action,27 and
members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern
or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such
purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding
securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power
to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
Id.
24. Id. § 1962(b).
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
25. Id. § 1962(c).
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
Id.
26. Id. § 1964(a).
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of
any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restric-
tions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not
limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making
due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
Id.
27. Id. § 1964(b).
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any
action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed
as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final
determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders
or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfac-
tory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
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subsection (c) authorizes a private civil RICO action for those in-
jured in their business or property because of a section 1962 Viola-
tion.28 Subsection (d) states that a criminal RICO conviction es-
tops the defendant from relitigating issues raised in the criminal
trial in any subsequent government civil RICO proceeding.29
Economics: RICO's Answer to Organized Crime
Congress premised RICO on economic deterrence, believing that
organized crime would be deterred if the government or private
persons had the statutory right to divest the wrongdoer of any
profits. Congress hoped that RICO's remedies would put economic
pressure on racketeers while punishing their criminal behavior.3 0
Congress defined racketeering broadly to include bribery, counter-
feiting, mail and wire fraud, and extortion, 1 because organized
crime used these methods to infiltrate and corrupt businesses.
RICO's author, the late Senator McClellan, underscored RICO's
economic purpose when he wrote that "it would be pointless sur-
plusage for [RICO] to cover crimes which are not adapted to com-
mercial exploitation. '3 2
The assumption that economic pressure deters organized crime
motivated Congress to pattern RICO's civil remedies after the an-
titrust laws which also are based on economic deterrence. Antitrust
laws protect competition by removing profit incentives for monop-
olization and unfair trade practices.3 " Congress believed that the
antitrust laws addressed a problem similar to that of organized
28. Id. § 1964(c). "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
29. Id. § 1964(d). "A final judgment of decree rendered in favor of the United States in
any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the
defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent
civil proceedings brought by the United States." Id.
30. Zuckerman & Hunterton, supra note 20, at 215.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976). See supra note 8.
32. McClellan, supra note 1, at 161-62.
33. "The value of private treble damage and equitable suits has been amply demonstrated
in the antitrust field, where they have been extremely effective in preventing and rectifying
economic harm to individuals and compames, and in furthering the public purpose of
preventing improper commercial practices." 116 CONG. REC. 35,227 (1970). See also S. REP.
No. 617, supra note 1, at 121.
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crime-how to maintain fair and open economic competition. Con-
gress therefore assumed that the antitrust methods, especially the
treble damage provision, would be effective in deterring organized
crime from infiltrating businesses.3 4
Unfortunately, civil RICO has not been as effective as antici-
pated. Of the hundreds of RICO cases litigated since 1970, few are
private treble damage suits.3 5 Various reasons exist for civil RICO's
dormancy. One reason is the civil bar's confusion over RICO. Law-
yers do not understand the statute's joint criminal and civil nature.
They do not know when the civil standards apply, how to use the
civil remedies, and to what activities RICO extends.36 Finally,
many lawyers are unaware that RICO even exists.
The primary reason for RICO's ineffectiveness is because Con-
gress' basic assumption, that organized crime can be deterred from
infiltrating businesses if the profit motive is stripped away, is ques-
tionable.3 7 Although racketeers undoubtedly pursue their trade for
34. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 81. See also Long, supra note 18, at 209. The anal-
ogy between civil RICO and the antitrust laws breaks down when one goes beyond the eco-
nomic context and examines the policies behind the two statutory schemes. Congress
designed the antitrust treble damage provision to regulate competition. Blakey & Gettings,
supra note 7, at 1016, n.29. The provision must be construed strictly to increase competition
while eliminating unfair trade practices. If a court freely awarded treble damages against
enterprises engaged in unfair trade practices, those enterprises conceivably could be ruined,
decreasing competition and defeating the law's purpose which is to increase competition. Id.
at 1042; Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE
L.J. 809, 852 (1977).
In contrast, Congress designed civil RICO to eliminate racketeering in business and to
compensate victims of that racketeering, Blakey & Gettings, supra note 7, at 1042, although
the statute's indirect effect may be to regulate competition. If a court freely awarded treble
damages under civil RICO, and as a result, a business controlled by racketeering declared
bankruptcy, RICO's general purpose would be furthered. Id. Thus, although the antitrust
methods are effective in the racketeering context, antitrust's narrow interpretative stan-
dards, such as the standing requirement, are inappropriate to RICO's purpose and should
not be followed. See infra text accompanying notes 81-110.
35. Less than 50 civil RICO suits were reported from 1970 to 1982. Strafer, Massumi &
Skolmck, supra note 8, at 662 n.54. For a listing of these cases, see id. at 662 nn.54-57; Long,
supra note 18, at 206 n.32. Many of these reported actions were dismissed as inappropriate.
See infra note 110. Currently, numerous civil RICO actions are pending. See Sylvester, Civil
RICO's New Punch, NAT'L L.J. 1 (Feb. 7, 1983).
36. Nathan, supra note 21, at 28. For a discussion on whether civil or criminal standards
should apply to § 1964, see Note, supra note 13, at 1059-64. See ABA Section of Criminal
Justice Report on RICO (Jan. 1982)(recommendations on reform of RICO).
37. Most lawyers, however, accept this underlying assumption. One commentator stated:
Organized crime is an economic phenomenon. It exists not for anything
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power and profit,38 other motives exist."9 Racketeers also use legiti-
mate businesses to gain respectability in the community, to laun-
der "dirty" money, to legalize their activities, and to avoid tax
prosecution. 40 Thus, eliminating the profit will not necessarily
eliminate these other motivations.
Even if Congress' assumption is correct, however, RICO, in its
current form, will not deter racketeers. Racketeers operate by ter-
ror and corruption. These means, by which organized crime infil-
trates the economy, are the real problems that RICO should ad-
dress. Furthermore, the "bosses" are well insulated from any kind
of prosecution. 41 Finally, persons attempting to sue racketeers face
enormous problems in proving that racketeering caused economic
harm and injured the plaintiff. Civil RICO's real challenge now is
not to eliminate a racketeer's profit motive, but to assist a plaintiff
in overcoming these impediments to suit.
DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN BRINGING A RICO CivIL SUIT
The Fear of Reprisals
To recover treble damages in a civil RICO suit, the plaintiff
must prove the following elements: the defendant engaged in rack-
eteering; the defendant invested the racketeering returns in a busi-
ness or entity with the intent to control such business or entity
through the investment; and the plaintiff was injured due to the
defendant's activity 42 Few people will sue a racketeer, however,
else but profit-rm terms of money and power If you accept that analysis,
then the solution to organized crime m the broadest terms is simply to elimi-
nate the profit If we can make organized crime unprofitable, it will go-
away.
National Assoc. of Attorneys General Committee on the Office of Attorney Generals, Use of
Civil Remedies in Organized Crime Control, Dec. 1975 Report, at 2 (quoting J. A. Jeffries
III of the Federal Organized Crime Strike Force).
38. PRizsDmEr's REPORT, supra note 1, at 438-39.
39. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 36-42.
40. PRESMEsr's REPORT, supra note 1, at 433; 116 CONG. REC. 953 (1970).
41. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 35, 42, 81.
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (1976). According to United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), a court can enjoin a defendant's racketeer-
ing activity to prevent infiltration into a business only if the plaintiff can prove a real threat
to his business. For problems related to proving a RICO violation, see infra notes 47-79 and
accompanying text.
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because organized crime "relies on physical terror and psychologi-
cal intimidation, on economic retaliation and political bribery
to terrorize its victims into silence. '43 Organized crime maintains
its "legitimate" businesses and organizations through terror by ar-
ranging for the torture, maiming, and killing of untrustworthy
members, potential competitors, witnesses, and prosecutors.44 Be-
cause of these threats, victims of organized crime are afraid to in-
form police of their suspicions or evidence of infiltration attempts,
much less institute their own suits.
Despite organized crime's regimen of terror, Congress believed
that RICO's civil treble damage remedy, which offered both a
lesser proof standard than criminal actions and a monetary incen-
tive, would overcome plaintiffs' fear of reprisals.45 The treble dam-
age provision, however, has not overcome that fear. Because suits
are lengthy, inflation lessens any monetary gain. Moreover, even if
treble damages create some incentive to sue, few plaintiffs are will-
Ing to risk their lives for the uncertain monetary gain. The govern-
ment does not have the resources to protect all potential plaintiffs,
witnesses, and informants. The lack of cases vividly illustrates civil
RICO's ineffectiveness: no private person has brought a civil RICO
suit against an organized crime figure.46 Thus, RICO has failed to
overcome fear, the initial and most significant obstacle to fighting
organized crime in the courts.
43. H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1969).
44. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 41. Courts sometimes have commented on organized
crime's violent reprisals. In Patnarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1022 (1969), the court dealt with a conspiracy to murder a casino owner
because he refused to cease operations. In Ferma v. United States, 302 F.2d 95 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 819 (1962), a former drug dealer-turned-informer was killed after
appearing before a grand jury that indicated his source. For a discussion of similar cases, see
Lynch & Phillips, Organized Cnme-Violence and Corruption, 20 J. PuB. L. 59, 60-62
(1971).
Recently, organized crime's tactics again were illustrated during the government's probe
into Labor Secretary Donovan's alleged ties to organized crime. An important witness, Fred
Furmo, was killed shortly before he was to testify. The government suspects that racketeers
murdered him. Darkening Clouds over Donovan, Time Magazine June 28, 1982 at 44.
45. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 41.
46. See supra note 10. In contrast, in 1981 the federal government obtained 515 criminal
convictions against organized criminals, and 587 convictions in the first nine months of
1982. Currently, 245 cases are pending. Webster, The FBI's Fight Against the Mob, The
Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 10, 1982, at 3, col 2.
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The Problem of Causation
If a plaintiff risks a treble damage suit against a racketeer, he
must prove both that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racke-
teering and that the defendant used those racketeering activities to
invest in or control an enterprise. 47 Proving a pattern of racketeer-
ing is relatively easy A pattern is at least two acts occurring within
ten years of each other after 1970, RICO's effective date.48 These
racketeering acts must be interrelated, "connected with each other
by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pat-
tern and not simply a series of disconnected acts. ' 49 For example,
two letters sent through the mail as part of one fraudulent scheme
constitutes racketeering activity
Proving the causative link between the racketeering activity and
the infiltrated enterprise is the plaintiff's central proof problem in
a RICO action. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant infil-
trated or controlled the enterprise through the racketeering, and
that the infiltration injured the plaintiff. 50 Gathering sufficient evi-
dence against a racketeer to prove these elements of a RICO viola-
tion is almost impossible. Organized crime threatens potential
plaintiffs as well as informants. Few individuals, therefore, become
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). The plaintiff must allege also that the enterprise affected
interstate commerce. Id.
For an excellent analysis of the proof needed in a civil RICO suit, see Spencer Co., Inc. v.
Agency Rent-a-Car, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D.
Mass. Nov. 17, 1981). Spencer involved an attempted illegal stock takeover. The court
found that defendant Agency used money received from an illegal sale to acquire Spencer
stock, a violation of § 1962(a). Additionally, Agency acquired Spencer stock illegally, a viola-
tion of § 1962(b). Finally, Agency's president and board chairman ran Agency illegally, a
violation of § 1962(c). Consequently, Spencer was injured in its business, losing suppliers
and customers. Id. at 92,214-17.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
49. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
Section 3575 of the OCCA, enacted at the same time as RICO, defined a pattern of crimi-
nal conduct as embracing criminal acts "that have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguish-
ing characteristics and are not isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976).
50. Proof of the link between the activity and injury is essential. See United States v.
Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Helfer v. United States, 435
U.S. 951 (1978) (RICO indictment dismissed because government failed to prove link be-
tween gambling and injury suffered to a mobile home business). See also Erlbaum v.
Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,772 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982).
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informants. Street workers never are told their "boss'" identity.
Racketeers force workers to remain loyal through a "code of non-
disclosure" and through furnishing money and food for the work-
ers' families.51 The racketeers use this secrecy and terror to insu-
late themselves from prosecution. In this context, disclosure
understandably is considered suicidal. Those who do inform must
request anonymity and protection by the government.52
At trial, the plaintiff must produce witnesses to establish the
racketeer's infiltration.5" Securing witnesses is at least as difficult
as gathering evidence. Moreover, even if the plaintiff secures wit-
nesses, racketeers often will try to bribe or threaten the witnesses,
the judge, and the jurors.5' Like informers, these people must be
protected from retaliation.
The plaintiff faces further problems in proving causation be-
tween the racketeering activity and the enterprise depending on
whether he sues under section 1962(a), (b), or (c).55 A plaintiff will
sue under subsection (a) or (b) if an outsider attempts to take over
the enterprise through racketeering. In contrast, a plaintiff will sue
under subsection (c) if persons within the enterprise operate it
through racketeering.56
To recover under subsection (a) for an attempted takeover of an
enterprise, a plaintiff must prove that racketeering money was in-
vested either directly or indirectly in the enterprise. 57 This re-
quires the plaintiff to trace the money from the racketeering to the
investment.58 Because racketeers can launder money easily, and
51. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 462.
52. Id.
53. Lynch & Phillips, supra note 44, at 62.
54. PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 1, at 463. Reprisals also occur in non-organized crime
contexts. Congress recently passed legislation to compensate for and protect against these
reprisals. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515 (dealing with retaliation and tampering with wit-
nesses, victims or informers); id. §§ 3521-3524 (dealing with witness protection and reloca-
tion); id. § 3579 (granting restitution to crime victims).
55. For an excellent analysis of the proof necessary under civil RICO, see Long, supra
note 18, at 228-33.
56. United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 720 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds,
560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
58. Long, supra note 18, at 229. One case interpreted § 1962(a) to allow evidence showing
that either the racketeering income or its proceeds "allowed or facilitated" the defendant's
takeover of plaintiff's business. United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir.
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because organized crime insulates its activities by not keeping
records and by holding anonymous bank accounts, direct tracing is
very difficult.59 The plaintiff, therefore, may have little or weak ev-
idence to prove causation. 60 The nearly insurmountable evidence-
collecting difficulties render section 1962(a) almost unusable.61
In contrast, a plaintiff who brings an action under subsection (b)
for an attempted takeover must prove only that racketeering acts
were used to acquire or control an enterprise.6 2 Because subsection
(b) does not require tracing, the plaintiff may have less difficulty
obtaining evidence and therefore less difficulty proving causation.
The proof required in subsection (c), which prohibits operating
an enterprise through racketeering, appears easiest to obtain be-
cause the plaintiff does not need to look outside the enterprise. A
plaintiff must show only that a defendant employee or associate
conducted an enterprise's affairs through racketeering."3 The
courts, however, are split as to what type of relationship is re-
quired under subsection (c) between the racketeering activity and
the enterprise such that the enterprise is considered conducted
through racketeering.6 4
1980).
59. Long, supra note 18, at 230 n.215 (quoting 38 SEC. ANN. REP. 86-87 (1973)).
60. PRESIDEN's REPORT, supra note 1, at 463.
61. But see Spencer Co., Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981), in which the plaintiff easily proved a
§ 1962(a) claim. See supra note 47. See generally, Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section
1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491 (1974).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976).
63. Id. § 1962(c). The person infiltrating the enterprise must be distinct from the enter-
prise itself. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F Supp. 1125, 1136 (D.
Mass. 1982).
64. Most courts liberally construe this connection and uphold any claim that alleges some
infiltration. See infra text accompanying note 69. Some courts are stricter and require that
the enterprise's essential functions be controlled by racketeering. See infra notes 65-68 and
accompanying text. A minority of courts avoid the connection requirement altogether by
construing RICO to apply exclusively to organized crime. See supra note 16. If a plaintiff
alleges that the defendant is involved in organized crime, he alleges injury per se. The plain-
tiff does not need to prove the link between the illegal acts and the enterprise. The court in
Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), reached this conclusion, asserting
that RICO's purpose and legislative history illustrated Congress' concern over organized
crime. Id. at 113. Two other courts recently adopted this view. See Waterman Steamship
Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, 527 F Supp. 256 (E.D. La. 1981) (the statute's history reveals
a clearly expressed intent that RICO should apply only to actions involving organized crime
activities); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (although
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In United States v. Ladmer, 5 for example, a civil RICO case
concerning alleged illegal practices within a union, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York re-
quired that the racketeering activity be related to the enterprise's
essential functions.6 The court reached this conclusion by examin-
ing RICO's remedies. Because RICO allows extreme remedies such
as forfeiture, dissolution, reorganization, and treble damages, the
court reasoned that the statute must be concerned only with an
enterprise's essential activities rather than small irregularities
committed in the course of otherwise lawful conduct.6 7 In Ladmer,
the court therefore concluded that a RICO suit was inappropriate,
because the alleged activity occurred only twice, and did not seem
to have a significant relation to the rest of the union's conduct. 8
Most courts do not follow Ladmer, but instead interpret liber-
ally the connection required between the racketeering and the en-
terprise."' These courts state that racketeering must have some re-
lation to the enterprise's activities, but it need not be connected
criminal sanctions may be broadly applied, civil RICO is limited to suits against organized
crime).
Other courts and many commentators dispute the view that RICO should be limited to
suits against organized crime. See, e.g., Mauiber v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 546 F
Supp. 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Hemold Commodities v. McCarty, 513 F Supp. 311 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v.
Mandel, 415 F Supp. 997, 1018-19 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980) (limiting RICO to organized criminals violates the rule that the
state may prosecute behavior, not status). See alsooAtkinson, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. § § 1961-1968: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Stat-
utes, 69 J. CRni. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9-10 (1978); Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note
8, at 671-85; Note, supra note 61, at 1496-97; Comment, Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues Arising in its Interpretation, 27 Da PAUL L.
REv. 89, 112 (1977).
65. 429 F Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
66. Id. at 1243.
67. Id. at 1244.
68. Id. Other courts apply a similar essential function test to dismiss RICO suits when the
legitimate enterprise provides only the setting for the racketeering. See, e.g., United States
v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. dented sub nom. Helfer v. United States, 435
U.S. 951 (1976) (two activities performed on the same property does not alone provide link);
United States v. Gibson, 486 F Supp. 1230 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (misuse of union funds for
social purposes not sufficiently connected with unmon's affairs); United States v. Dennis, 458
F Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (collection of unlawful debts performed not provide the neces-
sary connection merely because performed on General Motors property).
69. See, e.g., Engl v. Berg, 511 F Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. DePalma,
461 F Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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directly with the enterprise's essential functions. This liberal ap-
proach is preferable to the approach in Ladmer because racketeers
often use enterprises as fronts for unrelated illegal activities or, as
in most white collar crime, the illegal activities drain the company
of profits from its principal lawful activities.
The courts have formulated so many different standards that a
potential plaintiff easily becomes confused as to the type of con-
nection section 1962(c) requires. For example, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York stated that
the racketeering did not have to be part of the enterprise's day-to-
day operations,7° whereas the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania implied that the racketeering ac-
tivity must further the enterprise's purpose.71 Finally, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts implied
that a sufficient connection existed only if an enterprise's princi-
pals engaged in the racketeering, and the predicate offenses were
related to the activities of the enterprise. 2
Congress should define the connection required by section
1962(c) through statutory illustration, by giving the plaintiff con-
crete examples of the necessary relationship between racketeering
and the enterprise. Congress already has defined some of RICO's
provisions by illustration. 73 For example, section 1961's definition
of a person "includes any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest m property ,,74 Some courts also have
adopted the illustrative approach to defining particular require-
ments under RICO. In Unted States v. Stofsky75 and Unted
States v. Field,0 the United States District Court for the Southern
70. 461 F Supp. at 785-86.
71. Engl v. Berg, 511 F Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
72. Spencer Co., Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) I 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (quoting United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47,
54 (2d Cir. 1980)).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3), (4) (1976).
74. Id. § 1961(3). Section 1961 also defines enterprise by illustration: "'[E]nterprise' in-
cludes any mdividual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. §
1961(4) (1976). Significantly, the definition uses the word "includes," a term of enlargement,
not of limitation. Id. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 7, at 1025.
75. 409 F Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
76. 432 F Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
439 U.S. 801 (1978).
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District of New York used this approach. The court in Field stated
that the defendants must perform the unlawful acts in the conduct
of the enterprise's affairs, but the acts need not further the enter-
prise's interests, nor must they be authorized by the enterprise's
principal agents.7 The court in Stofsky held that section 1962(c)
required no particular relationship and illustrated various relation-
ships satisfying the statute's requirements."8
Plaintiffs and courts may find the illustrative approach less con-
fusing and easier to apply than variants of the essential function
test. Unfortunately, the illustrations could be read as limitations
rather than as examples. The illustrations therefore should not be
considered exclusive, but merely indicative of the types of relation-
ships and connections triggering section 1962(c) coverage.7 9
The Problem of Establishing Injury: Standing
Section 1964(c) allows anyone "injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of a violation of section 1962" to sue for treble dam-
ages.80 The section's wording is clear and broad, but some courts
interpret the term "injured" narrowly to prevent plaintiffs from re-
covering under RICO for state offenses and common law frauds.81
Restricting the type of injury required under RICO limits a plain-
77. 432 F Supp. at 58.
78. 409 F Supp. at 612-13.
The perversion of legitimate business may take many forms. The goals of the
enterprise may themselves be perverted. Or the legitimate goals may be contin-
ued as a front for unrelated criminal activity. Or the criminal activity may be
pursued by some in direct conflict with the legitimate goals, pursued by
others. Or the criminal activities may be [used] to further otherwise legitimate
goals. No good reason suggests itself as to why Congress should want to cover
some, but not all of these forms
Id. at 613.
79. The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), may ease RICO's causation difficul-
ties. In Hartley, the court held that when a corporation conspires with its employees to
engage in corrupt acts for a common purpose, in this case to defraud the military, the corpo-
ration can be both the defendant and the enterprise. If the defendant and the enterprise are
the same, the plaintiff establishes the relationship between the defendant's acts and the
enterprise almost by definition. The plaintiff then must prove only how the defendant cor-
rupted the enterprise. Thus, the plaintiff's causation burden is lessened significantly.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
81. See, e.g., North Barrington Development, Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tiff's standing to bring a treble damage action. Civil RICO's pur-
pose, however, is broad and remedial,"2 and a restrictive standing
requirement frustrates this purpose. More importantly, a restric-
tive standing requirement prevents otherwise willing plaintiffs
from instituting treble damage suits.
The courts that restrictively interpret RICO's injury require-
ment find support in antitrust decisions that limit application of
the Clayton Act's treble damage provision. A private antitrust
plaintiff has standing to sue only if he suffers competitive injury 83
Because Congress modeled RICO's treble damage provision after
the treble damage provision in the Clayton Act,8 4 a court deciding
a civil RICO case appears justified in similarly restricting RICO's
treble damage provision.
For example, in North Barrington Development Inc. v. Fan-
slow 5 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois analogized RICO to the antitrust laws and limited civil
RICO suits to plaintiffs who alleged competitive injuries. Fanslow
involved an alleged fraud in a real estate development contract.
The court noted that because RICO's purpose was to prevent in-
terference with free competition, only indirect victims who must
compete with enterprises engaged in racketeering have standing to
sue for treble damages under section 1964(c). Otherwise, the court
noted, every bad faith contract breach or common law fraud with a
connection to interstate commerce would be transformed into a
RICO suit."
The court in Fanslow had a legitimate concern because the
plaintiff attempted to receive treble damages for a mere breach of
contract, which alone is not a RICO violation. The court thus en-
82. Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 904, 84 Stat. 947 (1970) stated that "[t]he provisions of this title
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
83. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
84. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976) (civil RICO) with 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (antitrust
treble damage provision).
85. 547 F Supp. 207 (1980).
86. Id. at 211. For a variation on the competitive injur', requirement, see Van Schaick v.
Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982), where the court
concluded that § 1964(c) required plaintiffs to show commercial injury. Although such a
requirement is broader than a competitive injury requirement in application, id. at 1136-37,
it is not as broad as racketeering injury. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text. For a
criticism of Van Schaick, see Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 8, at 705-06.
444 [Vol. 24:429
CIVIL RICO AND PARENS PATRIAE
sured that RICO did not engulf areas traditionally reserved to the
states.8 7 In Fanslow, however, the court unnecessarily restricted
private civil RICO actions by relying too heavily on judicially im-
posed limitations on the antitrust laws. RICO's goals are very dif-
ferent than those promoted by the antitrust laws. Congress
designed antitrust laws primarily to increase competition, not to
compensate victims. 88 In contrast, RICO focuses on compensating
victims and preventing corrupt practices within a business.s Lib-
eralized standing requirements under RICO would permit addi-
tional suits and presumably would reduce corruption in business
and deter racketeers from infiltrating legitimate businesses.
RICO's primary purpose is not to increase competition, although
the statute may do so indirectly Limiting standing to indirect vic-
tims bars suits by plaintiffs whose businesses are rumed directly
through extortion, stock takeover, forced bankruptcies, or
scams-offenses that Congress specifically prohibited under sec-
tion 1962(b).90 A broader standing requirement therefore furthers
RICO's underlying policies.
Courts interpreting RICO's standing requirement broadly argue
that the statute's remedial purpose dictates unrestricted stand-
ing.9 1 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio asserted this view in a securities fraud case, Hanna Mining
Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd. 2 The court in Hanna re-
jected the argument that it should interpret civil RICO as narrowly
87. For an argument that, absent explicit congressional curtailment, RICO should be in-
terpreted as broadly as possible and include common law frauds, see Note, supra note 18.
See also D'iorio v. Adonizio, No. 82-0735 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1982) (available on LEXIS);
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
RaP. (CCH) 1 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
88. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 7, at 1042. See supra note 34.
89. See id. See also Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 8, at 694-95, in which the
authors define the difference between antitrust and RICO as the difference between preser-
vative and purgative relief. See generally Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
90. Section 1962(b) states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in interstate commerce." 18 U.S.C. §
1962(b) (1976) (emphasis added). For the definition of racketeering, see infra note 8.
91. See, e.g., D'iono v. Adonizio, No. 82-0735 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1982) (available on
LEXIS); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
92. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
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as the antitrust laws, stating that the two statute's purposes were
"so divergent that no reasonable comparison can be
made." 3 Because Congress wishes RICO to be interpreted broadly
to effectuate its remedial purposes, the court concluded that stand-
ing should not be restricted. 4
The court's interpretation in Hanna also is extreme. Because the
court imposed no restriction on section 1964(c)'s injury require-
ment, the court allowed RICO to exceed its limited purposes, and
permitted plaintiffs to recover for injury caused only from the un-
derlying racketeering. The statute does not prohibit racketeering
activities, but prevents economic injuries resulting therefrom. Ar-
guably, Congress wanted to rid the nation of organized crime; how-
ever, it chose in RICO to prevent racketeering infiltration of the
economy. 6 The statute's wording demonstrates its focus: section
1964(c) authorizes suit by "any person injured in his business
by reason of a violation of section 1962. ''1 7 The latter section pro-
hibits the use of racketeering activities or funds to acquire or
maintain an enterprise.9 8
If Congress had intended for RICO to compensate victims who
suffer racketeering injuries not related to economic ventures, Con-
gress could have worded section 1964 to refer to section 1961(1),
which defines racketeering activity 99 Congress clearly intended to
confine RICO's application to the economic sphere. Courts must
therefore be wary of applying RICO without limitation.
In Landmark Savings & Loan v. Loeb, Rhodes, Hornblower
Co., 100 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan reached a balance in interpreting the scope of RICO's
injury requirement by focusing on section 1964(c)'s reference to
section 1962. The court correctly noted that because section
1964(c) requires that a plaintiff be injured by reason of a section
93. Id. at 93,737.
94. Id. at 93,737-39. For a discussion of RICO's remedial purpose, see supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1976).
96. Id. See also Comment, supra note 18, at 934.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
98. Id. § 1962.
99. Id. § 1961(1).
100. 527 F Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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1962 violation," 1 standing under RICO requires "something more
or different than injury from predicate acts . "2 Observing
that the plaintiff in an antitrust action must allege an antitrust or
competitive injury, the court in Landmark stated that a plaintiff
under RICO similarly must allege a "racketeering enterprise in-
jury "103 Although the court never expressly defined racketeering
injury, it implied that the definition encompassed all injuries that
RICO was intended to prevent, including competitive injuries, and
direct injuries from scams, extortion, forced bankruptcies, and
fraudulent stock takeovers.104
The court's approach in Landmark fully realizes RICO's intent.
Its flexibility allows plaintiffs to bring treble damage actions under
section 1964(c) for all injuries resulting from section 1962 viola-
tions. Yet, this interpretation screens out meritless RICO suits,
and thus prevents plaintiffs from attempting to recover damages
for violations of the predicate offenses alone.
Recently, the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, in Harper v. New Japan Securities Interna-
tional, Inc.,10 5 agreed with the Landmark holding that the plaintiff
must allege a "racketeering injury" to sue under section 1964(c).
The court, in dismissing a RICO securities fraud claim, reasoned
that although RICO and the antitrust laws serve different pur-
poses, the analogy to antitrust is a logical point of departure for
interpreting RICO.108 Additionally, Congress did not intend to pro-
vide treble damages for violations of the predicate offenses alone,
because the statute states clearly that recovery is contingent on
injury suffered by reason of a violation of section 1962.107 The
court therefore concluded that although RICO expands the reme-
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
102. 527 F Supp. at 208. For a list of RICO's predicate offenses, see supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
103. 527 F. Supp. at 208-09.
104. Id. at 209. Again, illustration probably is the best method to define difficult concepts.
See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. For a view stating that racketeering injury is
indistinguishable from competitive injury, see Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Re-
sources, Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] F1. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11,
1982); Note, supra note 18, at 1110 n.51.
105. 545 F Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
106. Id. at 1007.
107. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
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dies available against racketeering, a "racketeering injury" limita-
tion is necessary to keep the remedy within the bounds of the stat-
ute's original intent.08
Courts are confused about RICO's injury requirement because
they do not understand civil RICO's purpose. Congress intended
for all persons injured by racketeering infiltration into businesses
to recover and thus prevent further corruption. Focusing on "rack-
eteering injury '  in an economic context effectuates that intent
and encourages private plaintiffs, alone or in class actions, to bring
civil RICO suits whenever they suffer injury from racketeering
schemes. o10
REFORMING RICO: STATE PARENS PATRIAE ACTIONS
The three major impediments to a civil RICO action-reprisals,
causation, and standing-can be overcome by individual plaintiffs,
108. 545 F Supp. at 1008. See also Gitterman v. Vitoulis, No. 82 Civ. 5908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
30, 1982) (available on LEXIS).
109. The ABA Section of Criminal Justice suggests replacing the term "racketeering ac-
tivity" with the less "pejorative" term "criminal activity" to eliminate the stigma of being
labeled a "racketeer." ABA Section of Criminal Justice Report on RICO (Jan. 1982). This
change would not require using a different term than "racketeering injury" to define the
type of injury RICO contemplates. The bar could eliminate all stigmas by substituting a
neutral term such as "RICO injury."
110. One other impediment to a civil RICO action is the recent proliferation of meritless
civil RICO cases which are dismissed at the pleading stage. These claims cause many judges
to view RICO claims with suspicion. See Sylvester, supra note 35, at 22. Consequently,
many courts closely scrutinize and narrowly interpret RICO claims, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 65-68 & 80-90, raising the risk that valid RICO actions will be dismissed. The
RICO claims that courts generally dismiss, however, usually allege common law fraud rather
than racketeering schemes. A disappointed investor, who may or may not have a racketeer-
ing claim, will plead under civil RICO because he potentially can receive treble damages.
See Salisbury v. Chapman, 527 F Supp. 577, 580-81 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (RICO claim dis-
missed because if allowed, it would cause RICO "to swallow up the whole of alleged common
law fraud even without the necessary elements of a fraud claim"); Adair v. Hunt Int'l, 526 F
Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (RICO not an alternative remedy to real estate misrepresenta-
tion); North Barrington Dev. Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (If
allowed, "every bad faith breach of contract or common law fraud would be trans-
formed into a RICO suit."). See also Alton v. Alton, No. 82 Civ. 0795 (S.D.N.Y. July 9,
1982) (fraud in divorce settlement not an offense RICO intended to prevent).
Congress did not intend to preempt a common law fraud or government corruption action
under RICO unless the fraud was perpetrated as part of a pattern to take over or maintain a
business. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). For a contrary view, see Note, supra note 18 (because
of the mail and wire fraud provisions, RICO is broad enough to encompass common law
fraud).
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but only with great effort. Congress could reduce these impedi-
ments and consequently strengthen RICO's enforcement powers by
amending RICO to provide for a state parens patriae action as an
additional remedy A state parens patriae action is a state suit
brought on its citizens' behalf in federal court to recover damages
occurring because a federal statute is violated. Because a parens
patriae action is brought on a citizen class' behalf 11 and provides
aggregate remedies, it resembles a class action; however, unlike a
class action, a presumption exists that the citizen cannot bring an
action on his own.""2
In the antitrust area, Congress amended section four of the
Clayton Act"1 ' to provide for a state parens patriae action in Title
III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976114 (Hart Act). This Act provided a practical and effective
remedy1 5 for private individuals injured by antitrust violations
who were effectively denied relief due to evidentiary, procedural,
and financial obstacles. 6 RICO is modelled on the antitrust laws
and contains similar private enforcement problems. The Hart Act
thus can serve as a model for reforming RICO, while taking into
account the different purposes of RICO and the antitrust law.
The Hart Act allows a state attorney general to bring a civil suit
in federal district court in the state's name, as parens patriae, to
recover monetary damages for injuries to its citizen's property be-
cause of a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.11 7 The court can
111. For a discussion of parens patriae actions in the antitrust area, see Statutory Com-
ment, Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions for Treble Damages, 14 HARV. L.J. ON LEGIs. 328,
329 (1977). For a historical discussion of the parens patriae doctrine as it has developed m
American law, see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972); Malina &
Blechman, Parens Patnae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.
L. REv. 193, 197-212 (1970). See also Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environ-
ment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COL. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 411, 412-13 (1970).
112. Parens patriae means literally "parent of the country" and traditionally refers to the
state's role as guardian of persons who cannot take care of themselves. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
rIONARY 1003 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
113. Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 15, 15a-15c (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
114. Title III, Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
354, 90 Stat. § 1383 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). For a
general overview of the statute, see Statutory Comment, supra note 111.
115. Browning, Parens Patnae Actions: An Assessment, 49 ANTiTRUST L.J. 1015 (1980).
116. Fein, Constitutional Issues Raised by the Parens Patriae Title of the Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976-An Appraisal, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1205, 1207-08 (1979).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)l (1976). The amendments affect the Sherman Antitrust Act of
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award the state treble damages plus costs. 118 To prevent delaying
tactics, or other abuses by either the state attorney general or the
defendant, the Hart Act authorizes a court to award interest on the
recovery.119 Furthermore, the court has discretion to award the de-
fendant attorney's fees if the state acts in bad faith. 20
The Hart Act also permits measurement of damages in the ag-
gregate by statistical sampling methods.1 21 Consequently, although
the state must prove direct injury, the court need not assess each
individual claim. 2 2 The court may distribute damages at its discre-
tion through various methods, including an individual or fluid re-
covery, 12 3 or by depositing the recovery with the state either as
general revenue or with stipulations.124
Unlike a class action, the Hart Act permits the state to notify
the defendant by publication unless such notice would deny the
defendant due process.126 Like class actions, a potential plaintiff
may elect to exclude himself from the action and any relief that
the state may recover. 2" The final judgment is res judicata to any
later action brought by participating parties, 27 and the court must
approve settlements to ensure fairness for all parties. 2
Applying the parens patriae action to RICO may be an effective
solution to RICO's obstacles. Parens patriae is -a discretionary en-
forcement remedy employed only when a plaintiff encounters se-
vere evidentiary and cost barriers, similar to those encountered in
RICO actions. 29 Furthermore, a parens patriae action is a complex
class action type suit, and necessarily appropriates limited state
1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)2 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
119. Id.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(d)2 (1976). The court may award attorney's fees if the state attorney
general acts "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Id.
121. Id. § 15d.
122. Id.
123. For a discussion of fluid recoveries, see infra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 15e (1976).
125. Compare zd. § 15c(b)1 with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (indi-
vidual notice is required in consumer class actions).
126. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)2 (1976) with FED. R. Civ. P 23(c)(2) (exclusion
subsection).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)3 (1976).
128. Id. § 15c(c).
129. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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resources. This Note, therefore, will evaluate whether parens pa-
triae actions will further RICO's underlying substantive policies,
mesh with RICO remedies, prove superior to alternative private ac-
tions, and overcome RICO's three major impediments: fear of re-
prisals, proof of causation, and establishing standing by proof of
injury
Parens Patriae's Effect on RICO's Substantwe Policies
Parens patriae suits, like class actions, promote important judi-
cial policies. For example, parens patriae suits increase judicial ef-
ficiency, prevent inconsistent results, and avoid multiple suits.130
Additionally, parens patriae would further the substantive policies
underlying RICO.1 31
Parens patriae suits will further RICO's substantive compensa-
tory policies. For example, a private plaintiff may wish to institute
a RICO action to recover for his injury. Currently, that person may
decide not to sue, because the claim may be too small or the
problems establishing the necessary proof may be too great.132 If a
parens patriae remedy is available, the private plaintiff can peti-
tion the state to seek redress. Because the state brings the action
and is able to aggregate small claims, a parens patriae suit spreads
the cost among the taxpayers and puts the litigation burden on the
state. Parens patriae actions thus will lower individuals' litigation
costs which will cause more people to seek redress for RICO
violations.
Additionally, parens patriae actions presumably will deter racke-
teers from infiltrating legitimate businesses. Because the state pays
for the action and carries the burden of proof, parens patriae suits
will encourage more complaints, resulting in more victories for
racketeering victims who normally do not have the resources to
prove their RICO case.133 The realization that the state, in addi-
130. K. SINCLAIR, FEDERAL CiviL PRAcncE 328 (1980).
131. See RICO's Statement of Findings and Purpose, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1073. See also supra note 1.
132. Additionally, parens patriae is an equitable action that the plaintiff can bring only if
the remedy at law is inadequate. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972);
Malina & Blechman, supra note 111, at 213.
133. Malina & Blechman, supra note 111, at 213. Prospective plaintiffs still may fear re-
prisal if they sue. For a discussion of how a RICO parens patriae statute could lessen that
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tion to the individual, can force organized crime to pay civil dam-
ages for its criminal activities thus may discourage racketeering
activity 134
Parens Patriae: Integration with Existing RICO Remedies
Parens patriae actions may duplicate or clash with RICO's
structural remedies.13 5 For example, the state may bring a parens
patriae action to divest the defendant of his interest in an enter-
prise. The action would achieve the same result as a divestment
suit which RICO currently affords the states as well as the federal
government.13 6 In structural suits such as this, parens patriae
would be a duplicative remedy, leading to judicial waste and
confusion.
Additionally, in a parens patriae action, the state acts for its citi-
zens.137 RICO, however, arguably authorizes individuals to sue for
monetary compensation, not for structural relief.' 8 A divestment
parens patriae action therefore may violate RICO's congressional
command. Finally, RICO's private remedies primarily assist racke-
teering victims in obtaining compensation, which structural reme-
dies cannot accomplish. Therefore, a divestment parens patriae ac-
tion would not fulfill RICO's articulated purpose of compensation.
Because a RICO parens patriae action would be created mainly to
assist victims to obtain compensation, and a structural remedy fo-
cuses on other RICO goals, Congress should limit the parens pa-
triae remedy to civil RICO treble damages complaints. 3 9
Parens patriae actions will further RICO's compensatory and
structural policies if a state combines in one action a parens pa-
triae suit with its own structural claim. Furthermore, a joint action
would promote judicial economy 140 The structural claim aims at
preventing future harm, while the parens patriae claim focuses on
compensating past injuries.
fear, see infra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
134. See infra note 143.
135. See supra text accompanying note 12.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976).
137. See supra note 111.
138. See supra note 13.
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)2 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
140. K. SINCLAIR, FEDERAL Civi. PRACTICE 328 (1980).
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The state, however, due to its limited resources and its interest
in a permanent remedy, may emphasize its structural claim over
the compensatory parens patriae claim. Such deemphasis of the
parens patriae claim could result in inadequate representation of
citizens by the state. Consequently, injured citizens may feel com-
pelled to accept unfair settlements from the defendants rather
than risk uncertain relief in a suit where they feel inadequately
represented."" Congress, therefore, should allow courts to deter-
mine whether the state is compromising RICO's compensatory pol-
icies for state fiscal economy or administrative convenience. If so,
the court should deny a joint parens patriae judicial structural
suit.14
2
141. As in class actions, parens patriae settlements are subject to court approval. Com-
pare FED. R. Cri. P 23(e) with 15 U.S.C. § 15c(c) (1976). This policy protects the interests
of all parties engaged in complex litigation and also ensures consistency between settled and
adjudicated suits. See Comment, Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. Rsv. 1318, 1360 (1976). See
also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LMGATION, pt. 1 (5th ed. 1981).
Neither FED. R. Civ. P 23(e) nor 15 U.S.C. § 15c(c) contains any standard by which a
court can measure protection or consistency. The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland, in In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D.
305 (D. Md. 1979), considered two major factors which courts subsequently have followed.
These factors can also be applied to proposed RICO parens patriae settlements. The first
factor is whether the proposed settlement is fair and a result of an arms-length bargain. Id.
at 315. See also Percodani v: Riker-Maxson Corp., 50 F.R.D. 473, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The
second factor is whether the settlement is adequate. 83 F.R.D. at 315-19. In determining
adequacy, a court should weigh the settlement against plaintiff's case, plaintiff's difficulties
of proof, anticipated costs, likelihood of recovery (the defendant's ability to pay), and the
extent of opposition to the settlement. Id. at 316. Adequate settlements are difficult to
achieve because the interests represented are diverse, and somebody's interests, either the
state's or the private person's, may be compromised. See Comment, supra, at 1537.
142. Although the state is suing on its citizens' behalf, the state naturally will push for its
interests over private concerns. For example, a state attorney general, eager to wipe out
corruption, may seek structural relief exclusively without regard for the individual damage
claims. See, e.g., Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). The state attorney general also
may agree to a settlement scheme that gives the state a disproportionate share. See Com-
ment, supra note 141, at 1553.
If the state settles, a court should determine whether the private parties are satisfied, or
whether they merely accepted the settlement due to their inability to bring suits. See
Woods v. O'Brien, 78 F Supp. 221 (D. Mass. 1948). See generally Sullivan, Enforcement of
Government Antitrust Decrees by Private Parties: Third Party Beneficiary Rights and In-
tervenor Status, 123 PA. L. REv. 822 (1975).
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The Superiority of Parens Patriae to Alternative Private Actions
To be an effective reform, parens patriae suits not only must fur-
ther RICO's substantive policies, but also should be superior to ex-
isting private remedies that do not deplete state resources. Because
individual actions are ineffective in deterring racketeering, 143 the
only remaining private alternative to a RICO parens patriae action
is the class action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) autho-
rizes class actions if common questions of law or fact predominate
over individual issues and if a class action is superior to other
available means of resolving the controversy 144 The class action
may be the only feasible course open to private citizens suffering
minor racketeering injuries.14 5
Courts permit plaintiffs to use class actions under civil RICO.146
Rule 23(c)(2) directs courts to ensure to all class members the best
notice practicable under the circumstances. 147 Formerly, courts in-
terpreted that requirement to include any communication, includ-
ing publication, reasonably calculated to give actual notice.148 In
1974, however, the Supreme Court reexamined the notice issue in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 4  The Court interpreted Rule
23(b)(3) to require individual notice to all class members who rea-
sonably could be identified regardless of the burden on the repre-
sentative plaintiff.150  This notice requirement prevents many
143. See supra text accompanying notes 43-110.
144. FED. R. Civ. P 23(b)(3).
145. To certify a class action, a court must consider the following factors: whether the
class is so large that joinder is impracticable; whether common questions of law or fact exist;
whether the representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class; and whether the repre-
sentative plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the whole class' interests. FED. R. Civ.
P 23(a). The action also must satisfy FED. R. Civ. P 23(b).
146. See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1980) (political contributions
extorted as condition for civil service and promotion can be compensated by class suit);
Hines v. City Finance Co. of Eastover Inc., 474 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (collecting unlaw-
ful debts against plaintiff class violated § 1962).
147. FED. R. Civ. P 23(c)(2).
148. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
149. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
150. Until Eisen, the Court apparently held that due process' two components, notice and
an opportunity to be heard, were fulfilled if the class was adequately represented, Han-
sberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), and reasonable notice was given, Mullane v. Central Hano-
ver Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Eisen required individual notice even if the class
were represented adequately. The opinion, however, could be interpreted as requiring indi-
vidual notice only when the class probably would not be represented adequately. See gener-
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plaintiffs from instituting Rule 23(b)(3) class action suits because
it adds oppressive investigatory and service costs for the represen-
tative party 151 These prohibitively high costs would similarly dis-
courage RICO class actions.
The Eisen notice requirement, however, does not apply to anti-
trust parens patriae actions. The Hart Act specifically permits no-
tice by publication unless such notice would deny a person due
process.152 This provision is similar to the old, more flexible class
action notice interpretation.15" Thus, the state in a parens patriae
suit is not burdened with the costs or the administrative problems
of sending individual notice.
Allowing an identical notice requirement in RICO parens patriae
actions is justifiable. The purpose of both antitrust and RICO suits
is to make compensation more readily available to victims of an-
ticompetitive activity and racketeering. 1" A flexible notice require-
ment aids in achieving that goal.
Two other factors make parens patriae superior to class actions
for complex RICO suits. First, in class actions, the court must cer-
tify that the class and the issues raised satisfy the express prereq-
uisites to the action.155 This process often is long and extremely
complex, especially if the class is largely undefined, as is possible
in a RICO context. In contrast, no certification is required in an
antitrust parens patriae action; the state must show only that the
persons on whose behalf it is suing are citizens and were injured
directly by the antitrust violations.15 ' This procedure is simpler,
ally, Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 97; Comment, supra
note 141, at 1394-1416.
151. See Dam, supra note 150. See also Browning, supra note 116, at 1015.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)l (1976).
153. Compare id. § 15c(b)l (notice by publication) with Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (may give notice by publication if it is most practica-
ble means available). The Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly consciously
adopted the earlier liberal notice requirement: "A direct cause of action is granted the
States to avoid the inequities and inconsistencies of restrictive judicial interpretation of the
notice and manageability provisions of Rule 23 "S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
42 (1976). For a view that Congress' position is unconstitutional, see Malina & Blechman,
supra note 111, at 216.
154. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
155. FED. R. Cirv. P 23. For the prerequisites for class actions, see supra note 145.
156. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceeding in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 497 F
Supp. 218, 224 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
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faster, and cheaper than the extensive class action certification
process. Again, a RICO parens patriae action should follow this
procedure, designed to expedite citizens' claims.
Second, the Hart Act permits the court to aggregate damages
after the state proves a direct injury to its citizens caused by anti-
trust activity '" Such judicial discretion avoids the necessity of
each plaintiff proving his individual injury in court. In contrast, a
Rule 23(b)(3) class action requires class plaintiffs to prove their
individual injury 158 This requirement lessens the effectivenss of a
class action, because the suit becomes essentially a multiparty ac-
tion in which time is not saved and judicial economy is not ad-
vanced. Because a RICO plaintiff faces proof, complexity, and cost
problems similar to those in antitrust suits, the aggregation provi-
sion is a preferred remedy
Furthermore, parens patriae suits include all the safeguards of
class actions. A person may opt out of the parens patriae suit, as in
a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. 159 Thus, a citizen injured more exten-
sively by racketeering activity and possessing the resources to sue
individually for treble damages under section 1964(c) may do so
without being bound by the parens patriae action. Additionally,
extensive court involvement in the action protects citizens against
unfair settlements.5 0 To protect the defendant, the final judgment
in a parens patriae action, as in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, is res
judicata as to any claim brought by a person who did not opt
out.'' Finally, in parens patriae actions, both the defendant and
the state are protected through court sanctions from delays and
other abuses.'62
A RICO parens patriae action also may encourage more com-
plaints of RICO violations than a Rule 23(b)(3) class action be-
cause the state carries the costs and the burden of proof. A private
person with a small claim often is unwilling or unable to gather the
requisite proof for a RICO action. 163 In contrast, the state's use of
157. 15 U.S.C. § 15(d) (1976).
158. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)2 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P 23(b)(3).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(c) (1976).
161. Id. § 15c(b)3. See also Keene v. United States, 81 F.R.D. 653 (S.D. W Va. 1979).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)-(d) (1976).
163. Malina & Blechman, supra note 111, at 213, 217.
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its investigative and financial resources through a parens patriae
action increases the probability that the plaintiffs will prevail, the
citizens will be compensated, and the racketeer will be deterred.6 4
Considering parens patriae's streamlined methods, procedural safe-
guards, and use of state resources to conduct a suit, a RICO parens
patriae action is superior to a class action, the only feasible private
remedial alternative.
Parens Patriae Strengthens RICO's Enforcement Powers
Both theoretically and practically, a parens patriae action ap-
pears to be an effective enforcement mechanism for RICO. The
statute already is complex, however, and potential plaintiffs fear
retribution if they institute legal proceedings. Parens patriae ac-
tions, therefore, must address RICO's serious retribution problem
and simplify its confusing causation and standing requirements to
justify its addition to the statute.
Pervasive fears of retribution surround any organized crime in-
vestigation or prosecution. 6 5 The individuals' fears, however, are
mitigated in a parens patriae action because the state brings the
suit and investigates the claim on behalf of the injured citizens.
The injured citizens are not named in the action; therefore, ano-
nymity initially protects individuals from threats racketeers other-
wise might make. 66
The injured persons nonetheless may have to identify the defen-
dant, assist in discovery, and testify at the trial.167 The state, how-
ever, is in a position to protect these persons against any threats. It
can arrange to change people's names or relocate them if neces-
sary 168 If victims wish to maintain their identities and their busi-
nesses, the state can provide undercover investigators to conduct
164. Id. at 213.
165. See Lynch & Phillips, Organized Crime-Violence and Corruption, 20 J. PuB. L. 59,
64 (1971). See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
166. The state maintains the action in its name. See supra notes 110-12 and accompany-
ing text.
167. Lynch & Phillips, supra note 165, at 62, 65.
168. Id. at 65. The same protections now are available to victims of reprisals in the non-
organized crime context. The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
291, 96 Stat. 1248 (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521-3524).
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scam operations. 169 These state scams insulate the business owners
from the parens patriae action because only the agents testify at
the trial.
The protection that a state gives to persons in a parens patriae
action is limited only by the resources that a state is willing to
expend. A state has incentives to expend the necessary resources
because corrupt influences damage both the state's economy and
its revenues. 170 Racketeer-controlled businesses raise prices, pre-
vent competition, and seldom pay taxes on their illicit profits.' 7 '
Eliminating the corrupt practices thus would strengthen the state's
economy and increase its revenues.
Moreover, because RICO is a federal statute, a state can coordi-
nate its protection with the federal protection provided in other
titles of the Organized Crime Control Act. 172 Such cooperation al-
ready is encouraged among the Justice Department, state or local
attorneys general, and organized crime task forces."" No single
government or agency can shoulder the entire anti-racketeering re-
sponsibility; coordinating state and federal efforts reduces each
government's burdens. Through a parens patriae action, a state
can assist in anti-racketeering activities, bring additional resources
into the controversy, and protect its citizens from retribution.
State parens patriae actions also may assist plaintiffs in estab-
lishing the causative link between the racketeering activity and the
enterprise, especially when racketeers use resources received from
racketeering to infiltrate an enterprise in violation of section
1962(a).' 74 Again, the use of state resources in parens patriae ac-
tions is pivotal. Normally, under section 1962(a), the plaintiff can-
169. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 45. But see Note, RICO's Enforcement Provisins:
An Interpretive Analysts, 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 941, 966 n.127 (1982) (broad civil discovery
causes government unwillingness to expose its agents or to jeopardize criminal proceedings).
170. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63 n.14 (1972).
171. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 76.
172. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). Title II authorizes protection and immunity
to witnesses. Id., 84 Stat. 926. Title III deals with recalcitrant witnesses. Id., 84 Stat. 932.
Title V authorizes protection facilities for state or federal government witnesses and their
families. Id., 84 Stat. 933. A state also can coordinate protection devices for victims and
witnesses in the non-organized crime context. See supra note 168.
173. National Ass'n of Attorney's General Comm. on the Office of Attorney Generals, Or-
ganized Crime Control Legislation, Jan. 1975 Report.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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not identify the racketeer-derived money to establish the link be-
tween the racketeering and the injury; the plaintiff often must rely
on meager and unpersuasive evidence. 17 5 The state has resources
and power to overcome evidence-gathering obstacles created by or-
ganized crime.
First, the state, unlike private citizens, could infiltrate organized
crime through undercover agents. 176 Instead of relying on sparse or
nonexistent records, the agents could gather evidence first-hand.
Furthermore, the agents could discover illegal resources that allow
the racketeers to invest laundered money in enterprises.'7 The
state could trace money through a racketeer's laundering process
by marking the money or noting its serial numbers. Additionally,
the state could elicit cooperation from local banks and the federal
and local governments. Thus, the state could obtain substantial
and persuasive evidence to establish the causative link between
racketeering and the injuries.
Parens patriae actions avoid the current interpretive standing
problems surrounding a private civil RICO suit. Although individ-
uals must prove either competitive or racketeering injury, 78 the
state need prove only that the persons injured are state citizens,
that the state suffered some concrete injury, and that damage to
the economy or to individuals has resulted. 7  For the state to
prove that the persons injured are citizens is a simple procedural
task. 80 The state then must establish that concrete injury occurred
175. PRESIDENTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 463.
176. But see Note, supra note 169, at 966 n.127.
177. Federal agents have been effective in infiltrating organized crime. For example, one
agent worked for five years as a gangster for the Bonanno Family. He so gained their confi-
dence that a leader promised to make him a family member. Because this agent infiltrated
the family, the government was able to bring a major RICO conspiracy suit against them.
For an account of his testimony at the trial, see The New York Times, Aug. 3, 1982, at Al,
col. 1; id., Aug. 4, 1982 at B1, col. 6; id., Aug. 5, 1982 at BI, cols. 5-6; id., Aug. 6, 1982 at BI,
col. 1.
178. See supra notes 80-110 and accompanying text.
179. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceeding in Petroleum Prods., 497 F Supp. 218, 224
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (antitrust parens patriae suit).
180. One potential problem exists regarding citizenship. A person may attempt to gain
citizenship in a state solely to participate in a parens patriae action. Even if that person
succeeds in doing so, the court should not permit him to share in any recovery unless he
suffered the same injury as other citizens.
1983] 459
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to its general economy or to specific individuals."8 ' In a parens pa-
triae action, the state benefits from a presumption of concrete in-
jury if it proves that racketeering harmed its general economy 182
Racketeering injury to the state can occur in two ways. First,
racketeers who infiltrate an industry injure the general economy by
artificially raising prices and eliminating competition. Second,
racketeers who infiltrate a business cause injury to specific individ-
uals and thereby indirectly harm the general economy ' 83 Thus,
when a state pleads and proves the existence of racketeering infil-
tration, it also pleads and proves that the state's economy suffered
a concrete injury The state, therefore, can establish standing with-
out a special showing of injury. 84
Finally, the state must prove only aggregate damages, l 5 or the
total damages suffered by state citizens. The court calculates this
amount using statistical methods.8 6 Judicial economy and proce-
dural simplicity are the policies underlying aggregate damages. 187
Each citizen need not prove the extent of his individual injury;
only that the injury exists. Moreover, justice does not suffer for
this efficiency Aggregate damages usually accurately reflect the in-
jury suffered because the court uses modern statistical methods. s
Parens patriae thus simplifies standing requirements by eliminat-
ing the need to prove individual injury and damages.
By allowing private citizens to use state resources, parens patriae
actions lower the impediments to civil RICO suits. Citizens, unable
181. Fern, supra note 115, at 1211. The concrete injury requirement ensures that the
plaintiff has a genume grievance against the defendant and will litigate the matter force-
fully. Id. The requirement is similar to an individual proving pecuniary damage. 497 F
Supp. at 223-24. See also Malina & Blechman, supra note 111, at 221-22. For a criticism
that this is an overbroad reach of the states' power, see Malina & Blechman, supra note 111,
at 217.
182. Fern, supra note 115, at 1212-14.
183. Id. at 1212.
184. For a view that establishing state standing is difficult and that the courts may re-
qure special showings, see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 263 n.14; Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Malina & Blechman, supra note 111, at 221.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 15d (1976).
186. Id.
187. Fern, supra note 115, at 1228.
188. Id. at 1227. See 15 U.S.C. § 15d (1976). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §
2.71 (5th ed. 1981). Samples and survey results are accepted as reliable in business and in
science, and may be offered in evidence as proof concerning the subject to which they relate.
FED. R. Evin. 703.
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to obtain evidence for their RICO claim, could petition the state to
bring a parens patriae action. Civil RICO's failure to encourage
private enforcement against corrupt practices mandates a reform
like parens patriae if the statute is to accomplish its remedial
purpose.
ISSUES RAISED BY RICO PARENS PATRIAE ACTIONS
Although parens patriae actions correct some of civil RICO's de-
ficiencies, these actions also create their own problems. In particu-
lar, parens patriae raises three serious issues: whether the fluid re-
covery provision violates either the defendant's or the plaintiff's
due process; whether the costs involved are burdensome to the
state; and whether issue preclusion applies to parens patriae
actions.8 9
189. A RICO parens patriae action may violate other constitutional provisions. For exam-
ple, an action may violate constitutional federalism principles that dictate separation be-
tween the states and the federal government. See W. BENNETr, AmERICAN TmORIES OF FED-
ERALISM 88 (1964). A violation occurs only if a state official institutes a parens patriae action
against a federal agency, because states usually cannot sue the federal government or its
agents acting within their authority. Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907). A plain-
tiff state, however, may sue a federal official in his individual capacity for money damages
when that official acts either beyond his authority or unconstitutionally. Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). See generally Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731
(1947); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). Because personal damage judgments
against government officials do not interfere directly with the government's functions,
parens patriae damage actions against those officials would not violate sovereign immunity.
See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). In the rare case,
therefore, when a state sues a federal official for corrupt practices, the suit does not violate
the constitutional directive against state intrusion into the federal government. Id.
The federal government, however, may sue a state. Normally, a state is immune from suit
under the eleventh amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. The Supreme Court nevertheless
held that this immunity does not extend to suits arisming under the Constitution which the
federal government institutes against a state. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
States impliedly waived their immunity from suit by the federal government when they
accepted the Constitution. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892). See also Parden
v. Terminal R.R. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (by empowering Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce, the States necessarily surrendered any portion of
their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation).
The federal government's power to sue a state is broad. Congress may expressly authorize
persons to sue the state directly to remedy fourteenth amendment violations. Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The government may ask for damages as well as injunctive
relief. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The federal government, however, may not
intrude into a state's central governmental functions. National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Due Process
A parens patriae fluid recovery provision might be challenged on
due process grounds. In fluid recoveries the court aggregates and
statistically assesses damages. The court then gives any relief to
the state, which either distributes the award to injured individuals
or allocates it to general revenue or other specified funds. 90 Fluid
recoveries arguably violate the defendants' due process rights be-
cause such recoveries do not require the plaintiffs to prove individ-
ual injury Additionally, the plaintiffs' due process rights may be
violated when the recovery is awarded to the state rather than to
the injured plaintiffs.'91
Fluid recoveries allow the state to prove aggregate damages.
Thus, defendants may not know whether the money owed is pro-
portionate to the damage caused. The use of precision statistical
methods, however, generally ensures that aggregate damage calcu-
lations are accurate.192 Moreover, most inaccuracies stem from the
defendants who, in an effort to insulate themselves from suit, de-
liberately neglect to keep records.19 3 Because accurate statistical
methods can be used, and because defendants often cause any in-
accuracies, fluid recoveries usually will not violate defendants' due
process rights. 94
Plaintiffs also might challenge fluid recoveries on due process
grounds when the recovery goes to the state rather than to the in-
jured plaintiffs. 95 This due process challenge has some basis be-
cause the state has no interest in guaranteeing that a private group
190. Fein, supra note 115, at 1227. See also 15 U.S.C. § 15e (1976); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 2.71 (5th ed. 1981).
191. Fein, supra note 115, at 1227.
192. Id.
193. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 1, at 44.
194. "[C]onceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the
risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created." Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946).
The state might violate the defendant's rights if it uses the aggregate damage procedure
to avoid collecting easily available evidence. In that case, the court can penalize the state for
bad faith and also require the state to prove individual damage. Malina & Blechman, supra
note 111, at 213.
195. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1016-18 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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receives a stated sum of money 196 If a state brings a parens patriae
action on the general public's behalf, no single person suffered a
specific injury and a general fluid recovery is appropriate. If a state
brings a parens patriae action on behalf of an individual, however,
the remedy should provide methods for the injured individual to
recover damages. Specifically, the individual should be allowed ei-
ther to opt out and file his own suit, or to petition the court for his
portion of the recovery 197 Such provisions would prevent fluid re-
coveries from violating the individual victim's due process rights.
Cost to State
A parens patriae action may not be attractive to most states be-
cause the state must bear all the costs of the suit. These costs in-
clude investigatory expenses, expenses to protect racketeering Vic-
tims, administrative costs, and attorney fees.198 Unless money is
available, the funds for these expenses must come from general
revenues. These costs, however, can be minimized if the state re-
tains all or part of the parens patriae fluid recoveries. Thus, the
funds would benefit all citizens including injured individuals.
Moreover, the state does not have to bear the whole loss if joint
actions are instituted with the federal government. For example,
the state could deposit the money in an anti-racketeering fund to
investigate and prosecute other RICO offenses.199 Conceivably,
state anti-racketeering efforts could become entirely self-support-
ing. °00 A state then could institute more actions because RICO
suits would not compete for general state funds. Finally, elimmat-
Ing corruption through RICO parens patriae actions will
strengthen the economy and increase revenues.0 1
196. Malina & Blechman, supra note 111, at 214.
197. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c(b)2, 15d (1976).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 165-77.
199. For an example of such a statute, see Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314.01 (Supp.
1982). Other state racketeering statutes include: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-129a, -129b
(Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. § 895.01-05 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3505d (1982); HAWAn REV.
STAT. ch. 842 (1976); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 5:12-125 to -130 (1980 & Supp. 1982) (limited to
casinos); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Purdon 1973). The Arizona racketeering statute is
the most comprehensive.
200. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314.01 (Supp. 1982).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
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Issue Preclusion
RICO parens patriae actions must address the question of issue
preclusion,0 2 which bars relitigation of issues already adjudi-
cated. 0 To preclude reconsideration, the issue must have been
necessary to the first action's resolution, and must be the same in
both suits. 0 4 Additionally, the first suit must have provided the
defendant with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and
must have resulted in a valid final judgment. 0 5 Because issue pre-
clusion avoids relitigation, the doctrine encourages judicial econ-
omy and prevents inconsistent results.20 8 Currently, section
1964(d) states that a criminal RICO conviction estops the defen-
dant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense
only in subsequent civil proceedings initiated by the govern-
ment.207 Defendants have argued that Congress intended to pre-
vent private plaintiffs from invoking issue preclusion in a civil
RICO action brought after the criminal conviction, because section
1964(d) refers only to subsequent proceedings initiated by the gov-
ernment.208 Some commentators therefore believe that Congress
should expand section 1964(d) to include an issue preclusion rule
for private civil RICO actions. 9
Codification of issue preclusion, however, is unnecessary because
recent judicial precedent indicates that the doctrine applies auto-
202. For a discussion on res judicata and issue preclusion, see A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/
PRECLUSION (1969). For a discussion on issue preclusion in the criminal and civil context, see
Vestal, Criminal Prosecution: Issue Preclusion and Full Faith and Credit, 28 U. KAN. L.
REv. 1 (1981); Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REv. 281
(1980). See also Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of Criminal Determinations:
Theoretical, Practical and Strategic Implications for Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70
GEo. L.J. 1079 (1982).
203. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
204. Id. at 326, 331. See Thau, supra note 202, at 1082.
205. See supra note 204.
206. One commentator disputes the judicial economy rationale. He asserts that when a
nonparty to the first action capitalizes on the first judgment by bringing the subsequent
civil action, suits that otherwise would not be brought are encouraged. Thau, supra note
202, at 1083-84.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1976).
208. Anderson v. Janovich, 543 F Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wash. 1982); State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
209. See Nathan, supra note 21, at 28.
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matically in civil actions following criminal convictions.211 Applica-
tion of the doctrine will not prejudice the defendant; the elements
of the offense are the same and were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt in the criminal prosecution. The defendant therefore had
ample opportunity and incentive to defend vigorously in the first
action.211
In a recent private civil RICO case, Anderson v. Janowich2 "2 the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton invoked issue preclusion despite section 1964(d)'s apparent
limitation. In Anderson, the court applied the doctrine based on
public policy rationales. The court first noted that issue preclusion
is a traditional common law doctrine,213 and therefore a statute's
silence did not abrogate the doctrine.1 4 Second, the court empha-
sized civil RICO's broad remedial construction and Congress' in-
tent that civil remedies should supplement, not supersede, any
common law remedies.2 15 The court therefore concluded that issue
preclusion applied in private civil RICO proceedings that follow
criminal convictions. 216 Although the question is unsettled, the bet-
ter view would allow issue preclusion in civil actions that follow
criminal convictions.
2 17
If the state brings both the initial criminal action and the subse-
quent civil parens patriae action, the case for issue preclusion be-
comes stronger. The parties in both actions are identical and are
bound automatically by the first judgment.1 In antitrust parens
210. The Supreme Court held in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), that issue preclu-
sion applies in criminal cases. Subsequently, the Court in Blonder Tongue Laboratories Inc.
v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), abandoned the mutuality of estoppel rule,
which prevented a party in the second action from invoking issue preclusion unless that
party also was a party in the first action. Because of -these developments, nonparties to
initial criminal actions can invoke issue preclusion in the subsequent civil action. See Thau,
supra note 202, at 1086-95.
211. Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REv. 281, 329 (1980).
212. 543 F Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
213. 543 F Supp. at 1128.
214. Id. at 1129.
215. Id.
216. Id. Accord State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F Supp. 673
(N.D. Ind. 1982).
217. Thau, supra note 202, at 1086-95.
218. When the parties are the same in both actions, mutuality exists. Issue preclusion,
therefore, automatically applies. See supra note 210.
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patriae actions, however, a prior suit is prima facie evidence in
subsequent civil proceedings,219 providing only a rebuttable pre-
sumption of the defendant's liability A court in a second proceed-
ing therefore may readjudicate the issue. Judicial economy is not
maximized by relitigation; moreover, inconsistency results if the
defendant is convicted in the criminal RICO case, but is held not
liable in the civil RICO action. Although issue preclusion might
apply despite a statutory prima facie limitation on prior actions,
the doctrine was designed to preempt the prima facie doctrine.22
Consequently, Congress should not include a prima facie rule in
any RICO amendment providing for a parens patriae action.
CONCLUSION
Congress promulgated civil RICO to combat organized crime's
infiltration into the national economy Unfortunately, difficulties in
proving causation and injury, and fear of reprisals seriously curtail
the statute's efficiency Congress should reform civil RICO by pro-
viding a state parens patriae action. Admittedly, a parens patriae
provision would not be a panacea for all the ailments plaguing civil
RICO plaintiffs. Because of limited resources, a state may institute
parens patriae action only against major racketeering activities,
leaving without remedy many potential plaintiffs who lack re-
sources to bring their own actions. Additionally, parens patriae
may create constitutional challenges, causing delays and increasing
costs.
Civil RICO's failures and problems may indicate that a civil stat-
utory scheme cannot combat criminal corruption. Nevertheless,
until Congress decides to repeal RICO, the statute should be im-
proved by adding the state parens patriae action, which would
overcome many obstacles to a civil RICO recovery
BETH S. SCHIPPER
219. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
220. The prima facie evidence rule was incorporated in the antitrust laws long before
issue preclusion rules became liberalized. Issue preclusion has superseded the prima facie
rule because it is more effective in protecting against relitigation of issues.
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